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Johnson: Antitrust in the Commodities Field: After Gordon

ANTITRUST IN THE COMMODITIES FIELD:
AFTER GORDON
Philip F. Johnson*
In the beginning, there was Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange.' In the end, there was Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 2 Astride the twelve-year gap between these landmark
Supreme Court rulings is section 15 of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 3 born in the Silver era but growing up in the Gordon
generation. The courts are left with the task of deciding whether
section 15 reflects Silver's past or Gordon's future. The conclusion
reached could have profound implications for both the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the commodity futures
industry.
In 1963, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was stunned
to learn from the Supreme Court in Silver that its activities could
be challenged effectively under the antitrust laws, even though
many of these activities were pervasively regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Supreme Court
held that, while NYSE actions subject to direct SEC oversight
might be immune from antitrust attack, the antitrust laws definitely
4
apply to NYSE actions that the SEC does not directly regulate.
The activity challenged in Silver, ordering member firms to discontinue wire connections with a nonmember, was not subject to direct SEC review. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the circumstances in which immunity from antitrust attack would be granted.
After noting the familiar rule that " 'repeals [of the antitrust laws]
by implication are not favored,' "5 the Court stated two criteria for
such immunity: "Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then
* Member, Illinois Bar. A.B., 1959, Indiana University; LL.B., 1962, Yale Uni-

versity. Mr. Johnson is presently Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Commodities Regulation. He has served as a member of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Advisory Committee on the Definition and Regulation
of Market Instruments.
1. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 15 is found at 7 U.S.C. § 19
(Supp. V 1975).
4. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1963).
5. Id. at 357 (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)).
115
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only to the minimum extent necessary. This is the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statutory schemes." 6 Although this
language suggests a single two-part test-(1) necessity to avoid statutory conflict and (2) minimum competitive impact-,the Supreme
Court dealt with the two criteria as though each was a distinct test.
The Court analyzed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to ascertain whether, in the factual context of the case, immunity from
antitrust attack was necessary to make the Act work. The Court concluded that it was not required. 7 The specific exchange action in
question was not subject to direct SEC review under the Act and,
therefore, "the Commission's lack of jurisdiction over particular applications of exchange rules means that the question of antitrust exemption does not involve any problem of conflict or coextensiveness
of coverage with the agency's regulatory power." 8 The Court observed that, absent direct agency oversight, "[d]enial of [the antitrust laws'] applicability would defeat the congressional policy reflected in the antitrust laws without serving the policy of the Securities
Exchange Act." 9 The Court noted, however, that direct SEC oversight could produce a different result regarding immunity: "Should
review of exchange self-regulation be provided through a vehicle
other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to antitrust exemption would be presented."' 10 Thus, the Court strongly suggested
that antitrust immunity might follow from direct agency oversight
under the regulatory statute. The Court made no mention here of
the "minimum extent necessary" test.
Having decided that antitrust immunity was unnecessary to
the operation of the regulatory statute because of the absence of
direct SEC oversight, the Court acknowledged that "self-regulation
does create problems for the Exchange."" In such situations, "the
6. id.
7. Id. at 358.
8. Id. (citations omitted).
9. Id. at 360.
10. Id. (citation omitted). The Court further elucidated this proposition, stating:
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny
of a particular exchange ruling, as there is under the 1938 Maloney Act
amendments to the Exchange Act to examine disciplinary action by a registered securities association . . . a different case would arise concerning exemption from the operation of laws designed to prevent anticompetitive activity, an issue we do not decide today.
Id. at 358 n.12 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 360. For delineation of the basic self-regulatory duties of a registered
national securities exchange, see § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78f (Supp. V 1975).
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Exchange is left without guidance and without warning as to what
regulative action would be viewed as excessive by an antitrust
court .... "12 This was the point in the Court's analysis where the
"minimum extent necessary" test emerged: where direct agency
oversight is absent and the exchange must justify its action in an
antitrust court. The Court stated that "under the aegis of the rule
of reason," 1 3 the exchange would be afforded an opportunity at
trial to prove that its action was not "excessive"; 14 that is, that its
anticompetitive effect was the minimum necessary to achieve the
5
self-regulatory objectives of the Securities Exchange Act.'
16
The Silver test, therefore, is not a single test but rather two
alternatives. Immunity may be predicated upon either (1) a finding
that the administration of the regulatory statute is incompatible
with the maintenance of private antitrust suits (statutory incompatibility); or (2) the defense that the activity's competitive impact,
in the absence of direct agency oversight, is the minimum necessary to fulfill self-regulatory duties under the regulatory statute
("rule of reason").
Commodity exchanges, as well as much of the regulated business community, assessed their vulnerability to antitrust suits in
light of Silver, and became alarmed. The commodity exchanges
were also regulated by a federal agency, the Commodity Exchange
Authority (CEA) within the Department of Agriculture,' 7 but that
regulation was far less pervasive than SEC supervision of the stock
markets. For example, the rules governing the activities of the
commodity exchanges did not require affirmative approval by the
CEA, nor could the CEA require that those rules be changed. In
addition, most important actions taken by a commodity exchange,
such as disciplinary and membership proceedings, were not di12. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 360-61.
16. By the word "test," it is meant that certain principles of analysis were established in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). The decision itself
did not apply all of the tests. For example, the statutory incompatibility test was
employed only to the extent that the Supreme Court found that the statutes were not
incompatible. Thus, the question of antitrust immunity when federal statutes are in
conflict was not reached in Silver.
17. The Commodity Exchange Act assigned to the Secretary of Agriculture the
duty to administer the Act. A bureau within the Department of Agriculture, the
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA), was organized for that purpose. Although
headquartered at the Department of Agriculture in Washington, the CEA maintained
regional offices in cities where major commodity exchanges were located.
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rectly reviewable by the CEA.1 8 Nearly all actions by a commodity
exchange would thus remain vulnerable to costly and protracted
antitrust litigation; the outcome of a controversy would depend
upon varying judicial determinations of whether, under the Silver
"rule of reason" test, the challenged activity was the least anticompetitive means available to achieve an objective of the Commodity
Exchange Act. 19 Despite that continued legal exposure, the Commodity Exchange Act required that the commodity exchanges restrictively regulate themselves with the same vigor and intensity as
the NYSE and other stock markets. The CEA's weak authority,
however, made Silver's intimated antitrust immunity for statutory
incompatibility far more remote for commodities markets than for
20
securities exchanges.
The risks confronting the commodity exchanges after Silver
became manifest in 1971, when antitrust suits were filed against
22
2
them by both the Department of Justice ' and private plaintiffs.
These suits challenged the legality of the exchanges' 100-year-old
rules prescribing minimum rates of commission for commodity futures transactions. The CEA claimed to have no authority to approve
or to require changes in those rules. The cases were eventually settled in 1973 and 1974 under agreements to phase out gradually the
minimum rate rules, 23 a continuing process. One factor leading to
the settlements was the CEA's limited regulatory oversight of
minimum commission rates in the commodity futures industry.
Another significant legal development occurred in the same
period. In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.2 4 This decision established the principle, citing Silver, that when an antitrust complaint challenges commodity
exchange actions arguably protected or prohibited by the Commod18.
(1970).
19.
20.

For the text of the Act prior to the 1974 amendments, see 7 U.S.C.

§§ 1-17b

See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
For an articulation of the commodity exchanges' duty to conduct com-

prehensive and effective self-regulation, as well as of the legal dilemmas then facing
the exchanges, see HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON H.R. 13113, H.R.
REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-48 (1974). See also Case & Co. v. Board of
Trade, 523 F.2d 355, 362 (7th Cir. 1975); Johnson, Self-Regulation: A Primer on the
Perils, 27 AD. L. REv. 387 (1975).
21. See United States v. Board of Trade, [1974-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 75,071
(N.D. Ill.
1974).
22. See Arenson v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 372 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
23. See text accompanying notes 21 & 22 supra.
24. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
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ity Exchange Act, the proceeding should be suspended until the
federal regulatory Agency 25 has had an opportunity to review the
action for compliance with the Act's requirements. 26 It should be
emphasized that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) action
challenged in Ricci, like that in Silver, was not under direct Agency
supervision, although the Agency could make an after-the-fact appraisal as to whether the Act had been violated. The Court referred the case to the Agency simply for the Agency's expert views.
The Court could do no more because the Agency did not then have
formal statutory approval powers over the conduct in question.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Ricci did not abrogate the role of the
antitrust court as final decisionmaker because the Agency, at that
time, had neither the statutory responsibility to oversee the particular exchange activity, nor the duty to apply the "rule of reason"
test of least anticompetitive means enunciated in Silver.
In the summer and fall of 1973, Congress undertook a
thorough review of the Commodity Exchange Act.2 7 In particular,
Congress wished to strengthen and expand the regulation of commodity futures trading. Congress had realized, as had the industry
itself, that the existing regulatory system was inadequate for the
times. Dismantling the Commodity Exchange Authority was Congress' first order of business; the outcome was never in doubt. In
its place came a new Commodity Futures Trading Commission
with greatly expanded powers over the exchanges, paralleling, and
sometimes surpassing, the authority possessed by the SEC.2 8 The
only serious debate over the CFTC was whether it would have ties
to the Department of Agriculture (preferred by the House)29 or
whether it would be an independent agency (preferred by the Senate).30 Ultimately, the CIFTC emerged as an independent regula25. The relevant agency in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., id., was not the
Commodity Exchange Authority, but rather the Commodity Exchange Commission
(CEC), which was also created by the Commodity Exchange Act. The CEC per-

formed limited quasi-judicial functions, including the suspension or revocation of
exchange licenses for violations of the Act, the CEA administered most other sections
of the Act.
26. Id. at 302.
27. For a summary of the principal legislative changes made in the Commodity
Exchange Act in 1974, see Schroeder & Pollack, Commodities Regulation, 8 REV.
SEC. REG. (No. 7) (1975).
28. See Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Newest
Member of Each Exchange's Management Team, 34 FED. B.J. 173 (1975).
29. See HousE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON H.R. 13113, H.R. REP.
No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
30. See SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FoREsTRY, REPORT ON H.R.
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tory commission with greatly strengthened authority over the commodities industry. 31
In all candor, antitrust considerations played a relatively minor
part in the initial motivation for congressional action in 1973.
Nevertheless, they soon gained importance as the legislation began
to progress through Congress. 32 The far broader SEC-like authority
that Congress proposed to bestow on the new CFTC could now, in
and of itself, bring the statutory incompatibility test suggested in
Silver within the reach of commodity exchanges in appropriate
33
cases. But antitrust also became a specific issue in Congress.
Congressional consideration of the relationship between commodity exchanges and antitrust laws began with the earliest version
of the bill (H.R. 11955) drafted by the House Committee on Agriculture. Section 106 of H.R. 1195534 proposed to add a new section
17 to the Commodity Exchange Act, immunizing from antitrust attack any exchange action taken pursuant to a rule that was either approved or required by the CFTC:
SEC. 17(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
contract market, registered futures association established pursuant to section 15 of this Act, or person registered under the
provisions of this Act who is acting pursuant to and in accordance with any order, rule, or regulation of the Commission or
any bylaw, rule, or regulation of a contract market which has
been required or specifically approved by the Commission as
provided in this Act, shall be exempt from the antitrust laws of
the United States as defined in section 12 of title 15 of the United
States Code, and amendments and Acts supplementary thereto.
(b) The Commission shall take into consideration the public
interest to be protected by the antitrust laws as well as the
policies and purposes of this Act in issuing any order or adopting
any rule or regulation, or in requiring or approving any bylaw,

13113, S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5843, 5844.
31. See COMM. OF CONFERENCE, CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 13113, H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5894.
32. For an historical discussion of the antitrust issue as it progressed through
Congress in the development of the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange

Act, see Johnson, Antitrust Under the CFTC Act: An Ounce of Prevention ...

,

20

ANTITRUST BULL. 441 (1975).

33. See id.
34. See Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 347-48 (1974).
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rule or regulation of a contract market or registered futures association established pursuant to section 15 of this Act. 35
The thrust of section 106 in the form above was modified by the
House Committee during a "markup" session on February 15,
1974, in which the express antitrust exemption in subsection (a) was
narrowed to include only exchange rules that the CFTC actually
required to be adopted. 36 This change seemed to suggest that exchanges might be barred from asserting an antitrust exemption on
grounds of statutory incompatibility for rules that they initiated
themselves, even when those rules had been subjected to close
scrutiny and affirmative approval by the CFTC. Had this interpretation been adopted, the antitrust immunity intimated in Silver for
exchange rules under direct agency oversight might not have been
available to commodities markets. They might have been left able
to assert only the "rule of reason" test. Thus, while acting under direct federal supervision, the commodities markets would have been
placed in a far worse antitrust posture than the securities exchanges.
Ultimately, the House Committee deleted the restricted exemption in subsection (a) that had fostered that inference, but preserved subsection (b) of section 106, requiring the Commission to
consider antitrust policy as well as the objectives of the Commodity
Exchange Act in the appraisal of exchange rules. When the Committee reported its final bill to the full House of Representatives, it
noted the "[c]onfusion in court decisions . . .with regard to antitrust consequences of self-regulatory activities of exchanges," 37 and
cited that confusion as an impetus to the development of the
Committee's legislative proposals. The Committee explained that
the deletion of express exemption language in subsection (a) was
done in "great reliance" upon assurances from the Department of
Justice that the legal principles announced in Silver would be
38
available to commodity exchanges in appropriate cases.
35.
36.

Id.
STAFF OF HOUSE COIM. ON AGRICULTURE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,

MEM-

ORANDUM OF COMM. ACTION FOR MEMBERS AND COMM. STAFF 1 (Comm. Print

1974).
37. HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE,
975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974).

REPORT ON H.R. 13113, H.R. REP. No.

38. Id. at 27-28. Indeed, the Justice Department's communication to the House
Committee on Agriculture stated that "present law provides an adequate antitrust
exemption for those activities of contract markets necessary to achieve valid objectives of the Commodity Exchange Act" and that "existing law assures the exchanges
that, where there is a conflict between the antitrust laws and the Commodity Exchange Act, the latter is paramount." Id. at 23.
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In addition, the Committee affirmed its intention to preserve
the analytical procedures of Silver in cases where direct agency
oversight is lacking: "Section 106 will assure that the public interest reflected in the antitrust laws will be weighed against the
public interest protected through regulation of the futures trading
industry." 3 9 Of course, section 106 delegated to the CFTC, rather
than to the courts, the task of making this appraisal.
The House Committee went even further; it wove the philosophy of Ricci into its proposal. In Ricci 40 the Supreme Court
had halted an antitrust suit pending a review of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's conduct by the CFTC's predecessor Agency to
determine whether the Chicago Mercantile Exchange had acted in
conformity with its duties under the Commodity Exchange Act. At
that time, the CEA's limited authority over the challenged activity
rendered inapplicable the statutory incompatibility test suggested
in Silver. Thus, the CME's actions were to be judged by Silver's
alternative "rule of reason" test; the trial court, therefore, was directed to retain jurisdiction ultimately to decide the antitrust issues after receiving the Agency's views. In reserving the trial court's
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed that, under the Commodity Exchange Act at that time, "[tflhe [CEA's] area of administrative authority does not appear to be particularly focused on
competitive considerations; there is no express provision in the
Act directing administrative officials to consider the policies of the
antitrust laws in carrying out their duties ..... 41 New section 106
radically changed the Act in this respect. It required the Commission to consider competitive effects in approving exchange rules,
and to balance antitrust policy against the regulatory objectives of
the Act. As such, the need seen in Ricci for a court to retain jurisdiction over antitrust claims where direct agency oversight was
lacking became doubtful, since the CFTC would henceforth apply
the Silver "rule of reason" test in its own review of exchange rules
and actions upon referral from the antitrust court. Nothing would
remain for an antitrust court to do after the CFTC had completed
its work except, perhaps, to review the Agency's decision for an
abuse of discretion.
When H.R. 13113 reached the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, only one change was made in section 106. The
39. Id. at 28.
40. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch.. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
41. Id. at 302 n.13.
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Department of Justice had urged the Senate Committee to direct
the CFTC to insure that it approve exchange rules only if they
were the least anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives of
the Act.42 The word "insure" was unacceptable to the Senate
Committee, which decided merely to require the CFTC to "endeavor" to approve exchange rules which were the least anticompetitive means. 4 3 The Senate Committee balked at the more
stringent formula because it "did not want to encourage excessive
litigation to test the decisions of the Commission to determine
whether they represented the least anticompetitive means of
achieving the objectives of the Act." 4 The practical effect of the
Senate's action was to modify the "rule of reason" test announced
in Silver by no longer requiring that the least anticompetitive
means necessarily be achieved in order to avoid antitrust liability
in cases where direct agency oversight was lacking.
The Senate version emerged from Congress as section 15 of
Commodity Exchange Act. 45 The final text states:
upgraded
the'
The Commission shall take into consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws and endeavor to take
the least anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives of
this [Act], as well as the policies and purposes of this [Act], in
issuing any order or adopting any Commission rule or regulation, or in requiring or approving any bylaw, rule, or regulation
association established
of a contract market or registered futures
46
pursuant to section [17] of this [Act].
When President Ford signed the new law in October 1974, commodity exchanges perceived several resultant benefits. First, based
upon the legislative history of section 15, the legal principles announced in Silver were clearly intended to be embodied in the
new Act. Second, the CFTC's mandate to consider antitrust policy
might mean that, irk future Ricci-type litigation challenging exchange actions not subject to direct agency oversight, the CFTC's
assessment following a court referral would constitute a final disposition of the entire controversy, subject, perhaps, to the court's
42. SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, REPORT ON H.R. 13113,
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEWs 5843, 5863.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 23, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5863.
45. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §
15, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 19 (Supp. V 1975)).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 19 (Supp. V 1975).
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review of the decision under an abuse of discretion standard.
Third, in a pronouncement that would echo into the future, the
Senate said that it "did not want to make the antitrust laws more
restrictive in the commodities industry than they are in the se47
curities industry."
The Supreme Court had not yet decided Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange, Inc.4 8 In Gordon the Court faced a controversy
which, unlike that in Silver or Ricci, involved exchange rules that
had been overseen directly by the SEC, namely, the NYSE rules
governing minimum commission rates. The Court expressly found
the antitrust immunity based upon statutory incompatibility that
had lurked in the shadows of the Silver case. It was now official: Antitrust actions will not lie against exchange rules that an Agency, acting diligently, has affirmatively approved and supervised pursuant
49
to authority granted in the regulatory statute.
Indeed, the Supreme Court refused even to consider "rule of
reason" issues such as the "wisdom of fixed rates" 50 or the necessity of fixed rates to the operation of exchanges as contemplated
under the Securities Exchange Act:
We believe that the United States, as amicus, has confused
two questions. On the one hand, there is a factual question as to
whether fixed commission rates are actually necessary to the operation of the exchanges as contemplated under the Securities
Exchange Act. On the other hand, there is the legal question as
to whether allowance of an antitrust suit would conflict with the
operation of the regulatory scheme which specifically authorizes
the SEC to oversee the fixing of commission rates. The factual
question is not before us in this case. Rather, we are concerned
with whether antitrust immunity, as a matter of law, must be
implied in order to permit the Exchange Act to function as envisioned by the Congress. The issue of the wisdom of fixed rates
becomes relevant only when it is determined that there is no
antitrust immunity. 51
Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed in no uncertain terms that the
Silver test actually consists of two distinct tests: statutory incompatibility and, only if incompatibility does not exist, reasonableness
47. SENATE COMM.ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, REPORT ON H.R. 13113,
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1974] U.S, CODE CONG. &
AD.NEvs 5843, 5863.
48. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
49. Id. at 685-91.
50. Id. at 688.
51. Id.
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of restraint in that the restraint is the minimum necessary to make
the regulatory scheme work.
In Gordon the Supreme Court also cited policy reasons for
refusing to permit the antitrust claims:
[To deny antitrust immunity with respect to commission rates
would be to subject the exchanges and their members to conflicting standards. . . .If antitrust courts were to impose different standards or requirements, the exchanges might find themselves unable to proceed without violation of the mandate of the
courts or of the SEC. Such different standards are likely to result because the sole aim of antitrust legislation is to protect
competition, whereas the SEC must consider, in addition, the
economic health of the investors, the exchanges, and the securities industry. 52
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that "permitting courts
throughout the country to conduct their own antitrust proceedings
authorized by Congress
would conflict with the regulatory scheme
53
scheme."
that
supplement
than
rather
The practical effect of Gordon upon the NYSE was minimal,
since the SEC had already ordered the elimination of fixed
minimum rates for securities transactions. 54 Nevertheless, the
long-awaited application in Gordon of Silver's statutory incompatibility test was universally welcomed in the exchange community.
Gordon also triggered debate over its effect upon the commodity exchanges. Section 15, the antitrust provision in the Commodity Exchange Act, evolved in the pre-Gordon era and embodied
certain concepts indigenous to the facts in Silver. For example, the
"least anticompetitive means" language of section 15 reflects the
test of reasonableness to be applied under Silver when exchange
actions are not directly overseen by the regulatory agency.
Gordon, however, held that exemption from the antitrust laws
necessarily follows from a finding that the challenged conduct was
directly and diligently regulated by a federal agency charged with
that task by Congress, without making an independent assessment
of the wisdom or necessity of the conduct. Does section 15, with
its built-in "least anticompetitive means" language, preclude the
immediate exemption of CFTC-monitored conduct and require a
"rule of reason" analysis in each case?

52. Id. at 689 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1975).
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There is no evidence to suggest that Congress intended such
a result. Two congressional objectives are clear: First, section 15
was designed to codify the basic philosophy of Silver, which necessarily includes its intimated antitrust immunity for exchange actions taken under direct agency oversight. Second, Congress "did
not want to make the antitrust laws more restrictive in the commodities industry than they are in the securities industry," 55 to
which Gordon clearly applies. In addition, Congress did not adopt
Silver's strict "rule of reason" standard of "least anticompetitive
means," but merely instructed the CFTC to "endeavor" to attain
that objective. This modification of the Silver "rule of reason" test
afforded the CFTC the same deference that the Supreme Court
felt was necessary in Gordon to enable the SEC to administer the
policies of the Securities Exchange Act. Moreover, the refusal of
Congress to adopt an absolutist test was expressly intended to discourage "excessive litigation to test the decisions of the Commission." 56 Obviously, that objective would be defeated if each action
of an exchange, under a rule sanctioned by a diligent CFTC, could
be attacked as unreasonable under the antitrust laws.
The conclusion appears justified, therefore, that the Gordon
precedent bars actions against commodity exchanges under the
antitrust laws when direct CFTC oversight is involved. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that antitrust issues are wholly insulated from judicial review in the commodities field. Section 15 of
the Commodity Exchange Act places an affirmative duty upon the
CFTC to consider antitrust policy in its decisions, including the
approval of exchange rules, and to endeavor to adopt the least anticompetitive means of accomplishing the Act's purpoges. A breach
of that duty by the CFTC should be actionable by aggrieved parties under the Administrative Procedure Act 5 7 or the Declaratory

Judgment Act. 58 Or, in cases of Ricci-type referral when direct
CFTC oversight of the challenged action is absent, the antitrust
court might retain jurisdiction to entertain claims that the CFTC's
appraisal under section 15 upon referral was an abuse of agency
discretion. But it is extremely doubtful that the CFTC's com55. See note 28 supra.

56. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1970). It is significant that the Supreme Court in Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975), noted the availability of this

remedy in cases where immunity from antitrust suit has been granted. Id. at 690 n.15.
58.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1970).
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pliance with section 15 could be challenged by an original civil
antitrust suit against the exchange, since the actionable wrong resuits from the CFTC's breach of its section 15 duty.
Antitrust suits against the exchanges for CFTC-condoned conduct would appear to be barred not only by Gordon, but by common sense as well. The Ricci principle of referring regulatory issues to the CFTC when antitrust actions are filed is still very much
alive in cases where direct agency oversight is absent.59 Its application to cases where there has been direct CFTC oversight would
amount simply to a referral to the CFTC to take a second look at
its earlier decision. Even if the CFTC were to reverse itself, there
would appear to be little merit or justice in assessing antitrust
damages against an exchange that has operated confidently under a
previously approved rule. The more efficacious procedure would
seem to be a direct challenge to the CFTC under section 15, leaving the exchange to be governed in the future by the eventual outcome of the litigation.
59. As recently as May 4, 1976, the CFTC announced publicly that it will entertain Ricci-type referrals in antitrust cases. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,155 (1976).
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